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Abstract: 
Why do people engage in entrepreneurship and commit large parts of their personal wealth to 
their business, despite comparably low returns and high risk? This paper connects several 
streams of literature to shed some light on this puzzle and suggests possible future research 
avenues. Key insights from the literature are that entrepreneurs may operate in imperfect 
financial markets and that entrepreneurs are less risk-averse than the rest of the population. A 
focus of this paper is, therefore, on the role of heterogeneous risk attitudes in entrepreneurial 
decisions, specifically portfolio choice and the entry and exit decisions. Nonpecuniary 
benefits of entrepreneurship, such as being independent in the workplace, also contribute to 
an explanation of entrepreneurial behavior. 
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Recent literature has greatly improved the understanding of entrepreneurship, including the 
determinants of entry and exit and of entrepreneurial investment and financing decisions. Yet 
despite the progress made, a fundamental question remains: Why do people engage in 
entrepreneurship and commit large parts of their personal wealth to their business, despite the 
fact that the monetary risk-return trade-off, on average, looks rather unattractive in 
comparison to alternative wage employment (Hamilton, 2000) and investment in a public 
equity portfolio (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002)? This chapter attempts to connect 
several streams of literature to shed some light on possible research avenues forward. Key 
insights from the literature are that entrepreneurs may operate in imperfect financial markets 
and that entrepreneurs seem to be less risk-averse than the rest of the population. 
Nonpecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship, such as utility from being independent in the 
workplace, also seem to play an important role. 
In this chapter I examine the stylized facts behind what is sometimes called the “private 
equity premium puzzle,” which denotes the observation that returns to private business equity 
are low in spite of the high risk associated with it. I present literature providing possible 
theoretical explanations under the assumption of borrowing constraints and point out that 
empirical evidence on credit constraints remains controversial. I investigate the role of 
heterogeneous risk attitudes in entrepreneurial decisions, specifically the choice to be an 
entrepreneur and the entry and exit decisions, with an excursus on taxation. I also discuss 
portfolio choice and the financing decisions of entrepreneurs. The picture emerges that more 
risk-tolerant people self-select into entrepreneurship and are willing to put at risk a large 
share of their wealth. I conclude by suggesting how credit constraints and heterogeneous risk 
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attitudes may complementarily explain the private equity premium puzzle, and point to 
possible directions for further research. 
2 The Private Equity Premium Puzzle 
Throughout the world entrepreneurs tend to invest a large share of their wealth in their own 
firms. As a consequence they hold highly undiversified asset portfolios, which imply high 
risk. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) investigate whether the returns to private 
equity in the United States compensate entrepreneurs for the high risk, that is, if they earn an 
adequate risk premium. Their results indicate that the average returns to private equity are not 
higher than the returns to the public market equity index. Why, then, do entrepreneurs invest 
so much in the equity of a single private firm, which is likely to be much riskier than 
investing in the public equity index? The authors term their finding a “private equity 
premium puzzle,” albeit cautiously, with a question mark. 
The classical public equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985), in contrast, is 
concerned with the much higher returns to public equity stocks in comparison to safe 
government bonds. In standard models only an implausibly high degree of risk aversion could 
explain why people invest in safe bonds at all, given the spread in the returns. This makes 
even more puzzling the observation that entrepreneurs take on even larger risks in private 
equity without, on average, earning higher returns than on the public equity market. 
Three stylized facts together constitute the private equity premium puzzle: the high 
shares in their wealth portfolio that entrepreneurs invest in their own firm equity, the high 
risk entrepreneurs bear as a result, and the low returns to private equity. 
The first stylized fact, which describes the undiversified portfolios of entrepreneurs, is 
well documented. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) report that entrepreneurial 
households in the United States invest on average as much as 41.1 percent of their wealth in 
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private firm equity. Here entrepreneurial households are defined as households with positive 
private business equity holdings and positive net worth. Moreover this investment in private 
equity is typically devoted to a single private firm in which the household has an active 
management interest. According to the authors, the average household that owns private 
equity has 82 percent of its private equity invested in such a firm. The primary data source in 
this and a number of related studies is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a sample of 
about 4,000 U.S. households per survey year that includes information on individual 
household portfolio compositions, including investment in both private and publicly traded 
firms. In their study Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen use the survey years 1989, 1992, 
1995, and 1998. As supplementary data sources, they employ the Flow of Funds Accounts 
(FFA) and the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) over the longer time period of 
1952 to 1999, and a number of other sources. Gentry and Hubbard (2004) analyze the role of 
entrepreneurship in household saving, using data from the 1983 and 1989 SCF. Consistent 
with the results of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, they find that active businesses account 
for 41.5 percent of entrepreneurs’ assets. 
Similarly undiversified portfolios of entrepreneurs are observed in Germany, as 
documented by Fossen (2011). In 2002 entrepreneurs, that is, those with positive private 
business equity holdings, invested 48 percent of their gross wealth in their own enterprise, 
and in 2007 the share was 42.9 percent. This analysis is based on the German Socio-
Economic Panel Survey (SOEP), a representative yearly panel survey that gathers 
information about more than 21,000 individuals living in 12,000 German households (cf. 
Wagner et al., 2007). The 2002 and 2007 waves included special modules collecting 
information about private wealth balance sheets. Table 1 shows the portfolio compositions of 
individuals in Germany in 2002 and 2007 and of households in the United States in 1989, 
based on Fossen (2011) and Gentry and Hubbard (2004), respectively. Apart from the 
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entrepreneurs’ large portfolio shares of private business equity in both countries, another 
interesting observation from the table is that home property plays a more important role in 
Germany than in the United States, whereas Americans invest a greater share of their 
portfolio in financial assets, such as stocks and bonds. Consistent with that, Germans make 
more use of mortgage loans, while Americans resort to other forms of debt. 
Table 1: Portfolio compositions of entrepreneurs and others (percentage of gross wealth) 
 Entrepreneurs 
Asset category Germany 2002 Germany 2007 U.S. 1989 
Active private business   41.5 
Passive private business   7.4 
Private business 48.0 42.9 48.9 
Owner-occupied housing 17.8 19.7 12.6 
Other property 22.0 22.7 17.7 
Financial assets 4.5 8.0 13.8 
Life and private pension insurance 6.9 6.4 3.1 
Tangible assets 0.8 0.4 4.1 
Gross wealth 100 100 100 
Mortgage 12.1 12.3 3.8 
Other liabilities 3.1 4.5 8.1 
Net worth 84.9 83.2 88.1 
 Others 
Asset category Germany 2002 Germany 2007 U.S. 1989 
Active private business   0.0 
Passive private business   1.7 
Private business 0.0 0.0 1.7 
Owner-occupied housing 60.5 58.2 41.1 
Other property 14.0 18.5 15.1 
Financial assets 11.1 12.1 28.1 
Life and private pension insurance 13.4 10.5 6.7 
Tangible assets 1.0 0.7 7.3 
Gross wealth 100 100 100 
Mortgage 21.0 21.5 10.8 
Other liabilities 2.5 2.3 6.3 
Net worth 76.5 76.2 82.9 
Source: Modified from Gentry and Hubbard (2004a), based on the SCF (1989) for the United States, and 
Fossen (2011), based on the SOEP (2002/2007), for Germany. 
 
The second stylized fact behind the private equity premium puzzle is that entrepreneurs 
bear substantial risk. It is clear from portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) that the lack of 
diversification in entrepreneurs’ portfolios, as documented above, is risky. Returns to 
investment in small entrepreneurial firms are very volatile, and failure rates are high, as 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) show for the United States. Representative data on 
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the returns to equity and the volatility of these returns in single proprietorships or 
partnerships are unavailable, as small nonpublic businesses are not usually obliged to publish 
their profit and loss accounts and typically prefer to keep operating figures confidential. To 
get an impression nevertheless, it is worthwhile to look at public market firms. Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jorgensen report that the annual standard deviation of returns to public firms 
(market value) was 17 percent in the period 1953–1999, but as much as 41.1 percent in the 
smallest decile of public firm returns. A portfolio of even smaller private firms is likely to be 
at least as volatile. More important, since entrepreneurs typically own equity in a single 
private firm, as reported above, the risk faced by the average entrepreneur is likely to be still 
higher. The annual standard deviation of a typical single public firm’s equity return is 50 to 
60 percent, according to Campbell et al. (2001) and cited by Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen. Another indication is that log returns to venture capital investments are very 
volatile, with an 89 percent annualized standard deviation in the United States, as compared 
to only 14.9 percent annualized standard deviation of the log S&P return (Cochrane, 2005). 
Venture capital and private equity funds data from North and South America, Europe, and 
Asia confirm a high volatility of venture capital returns (Cumming and Walz, 2010). 
Furthermore Heaton and Lucas (2000) report that entrepreneurial households hold less wealth 
in stocks than nonentrepreneurial households. They argue that entrepreneurs avoid stocks as a 
risky form of investment (in comparison to bonds) because of the high background risk they 
already face as entrepreneurs. 
The third stylized fact, which states that returns to private business equity are low in 
comparison to the public equity benchmark, is the most difficult one to verify, because 
accessible data on private business equity values and profits are very limited by nature, as 
mentioned before. The study by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), who conclude that 
the returns to private equity are no higher than those to public equity, represents the most 
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comprehensive published analysis to date. Table 2 summarizes some of their estimates. The 
first row shows the geometric average annual return from investing in private equity in the 
United States in different time periods. Adjusting the returns for the entrepreneurs’ labor 
input and entries and exits of firms reduces the return estimates (second row). The authors 
compare the returns to private equity with returns to a value-weighted index of NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ public equity, using public stock return information from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The public equity returns, which are shown at the 
bottom of the table, are similar to the unadjusted, and higher than the adjusted, private equity 
returns. As private firms are typically much smaller than public companies, Moskowitz and 
Vissing-Jorgensen argue that it is more appropriate to compare them with the smallest decile 
of publicly traded firms. The returns of these firms exceed the private equity returns for most 
and the adjusted private equity returns for all of the time periods considered (last row). 
Table 2: Annual returns to private equity in the United States in percentages (geometric 
averages) 
Time Period 1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 1953-1999 1963-1999 




Private equity returns 12.3 17.0 22.2 12.8 12.8 
Private equity returns (adjusted) 8.2 13.0 19.4 n/a n/a 
Data source CRSP data 
Public equity returns, value-weighted index 11.0 14.6 24.7 12.7 15.6 
Public equity returns, smallest decile 30.5 20.3 22.0 18.2 n/a 
Note: The adjusted returns account for the entrepreneurs’ labor input, firm entries, and firm exits. Source: 
Modified from Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). 
 
At first sight, high returns observed for venture capital investments seem to contradict 
the story of low returns to private equity. However, returns to venture capital investments can 
be measured only when a firm goes public, is acquired, or gets a new financing round. As 
Cochrane (2005) argues, these events are more likely when a firm has achieved a good return. 
His empirical analysis shows that correcting for selectivity bias dramatically reduces the 
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return estimates. Hall and Woodward (2010) analyze a database covering start-up companies 
backed by venture capital in the United States from 1987 to 2008, which were mainly 
involved in information technology and biotechnology. They find that the entrepreneurs’ risk-
adjusted payoffs were small on average, and three-quarters of the entrepreneurs even faced 
zero rewards. Even making an invention with the intention to commercialize it as an 
entrepreneur does not lead to very high returns on average. Based on a survey of 1,095 
independent inventors in Canada, Astebro (2003) estimates that the pretax internal rate of 
return on a portfolio investment in independent inventions is 11.4 percent. 
Hamilton’s (2000) results also support the finding that monetary returns to 
entrepreneurship are low. He compares hourly earnings of the self-employed with those of 
the dependently employed and finds that most of the self-employed enter and persist in 
business despite the fact that they have both lower initial earnings and lower earnings growth 
in self-employment than they would have in dependent employment. 
Hamilton (2000) argues that significant nonpecuniary benefits, such as “being your own 
boss,” may explain why some people choose to be entrepreneurs despite the low monetary 
returns. Consistent with this, both Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Benz and Frey 
(2008) report that the self-employed experience greater job satisfaction than other workers; 
the latter authors control for income gained and hours worked. Frey et al. (2004) extend the 
common utility concept, where individuals derive utility from outcomes such as consumption 
and leisure, and introduce procedural utility, where people additionally attach a value to the 
procedures that lead to the outcomes. Using this concept, Benz and Frey conclude that the 
self-employed receive procedural utility from being independent in the workplace, as 
opposed to being in a hierarchy. Based on the SOEP, Fuchs-Schündeln (2009) provides 
further support for this hypothesis by using the change in life satisfaction reported by East 
Germans after the transition from communism to democracy as a proxy for the individual 
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preference for being independent. She shows that those who value independence higher 
receive greater job satisfaction from self-employment. 
It should be noted that the empirical results of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) 
about the low monetary returns to private business equity have not remained unchallenged. In 
a working paper, Kartashova (2011) extends the SCF data used by those authors by 
additionally employing the waves 2001, 2004, and 2007. She reports that the finding of 
comparably low returns to private equity does not hold beyond the period of high public 
equity returns in the 1990s. According to Kartashova, the returns to entrepreneurial equity 
remained largely unaffected when public equity returns plunged between 1999 and 2001. The 
inconclusive evidence calls for more empirical research into the returns to private equity, 
both over longer time periods and over different countries. 
3 Liquidity Constraints as a Possible Explanation 
If it is taken for granted that entrepreneurs typically face an unfavorable risk-return trade-off, 
the question is why they invest such a large share of their wealth in their own business. 
One possible explanation for the private equity premium puzzle is that external financing 
may be costly in imperfect financial markets due to asymmetric information. In other words, 
entrepreneurs would like to diversify, but face binding credit constraints. Gentry and Hubbard 
(2004) suggest that this is a possible explanation for the undiversified entrepreneurial 
portfolios they observe. 
Some theories explain the empirical outcome under the assumption of borrowing 
constraints. Polkovnichenko (2003) develops such a model, which is able to reproduce the 
empirical findings after calibration. A key insight provided by this paper is that entrepreneurs 
do not put at risk their human capital, which, according to the author, represents the largest 
and safest asset for most entrepreneurs at the time of starting their business. Consequently 
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small private benefits from entrepreneurship are sufficient to explain why people become 
entrepreneurs despite facing restrictions in risk diversification. These may be nonpecuniary 
benefits of control, such as “being your own boss,” as mentioned earlier. Hintermaier and 
Steinberger (2005) present a theoretical model of occupational choice over the life cycle 
under borrowing constraints and imperfect information about the profitability of potential 
businesses, which is also able to fit the empirical observation. Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn 
(2009) develop a dynamic occupational choice model that allows entrepreneurs to choose 
projects with different degrees of risk. Due to the assumptions of borrowing constraints, those 
with sufficient funds for investment decide to become entrepreneurs, while the less wealthy 
prefer wage employment. The possibility of a discrete occupational switch in the future 
implies that agents with wealth close to the occupational switch threshold find it optimal to 
invest in risky projects without requiring a risk premium if they are sufficiently impatient. 
Bitler et al. (2005), among others, demonstrate how principal-agent problems between 
insiders and outsiders may help to explain the concentrated ownership of entrepreneurs. In 
their model, a risk-averse entrepreneur seeking financing wishes to sell part of her equity 
stake in her firm to outside investors, who are concerned with moral hazard. To align the 
entrepreneur’s incentives with the outside investors’ objectives, the entrepreneur is forced to 
hold a large ownership share in her own firm. The authors test and confirm the implications 
of their theory using various waves of the SCF and the (National) Survey of Small Business 
Finances of 1993 and 1998. 
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) construct and calibrate another model of occupational 
choice, where borrowing constraints are crucial determinants of entrepreneurial decisions, 
including investment. A key ingredient to their model is a potentially high rate of return to 
entrepreneurship, which differs from the empirical findings of Moskowitz and Vissing-
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Jorgensen (2002). Cagetti and De Nardi (2009) employ a similar framework with business 
investment and borrowing constraints to study estate taxation. 
Complementarily to the theoretical work, a sizable empirical literature has presented 
evidence that suggests that credit constraints for entrepreneurs are real. Such credit 
constraints may prevent a certain fraction of would-be entrepreneurs from starting a business. 
In the presence of imperfect financial markets, own wealth should decrease the probability of 
being constrained and thus increase the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Consistent 
with this, Evans and Jovanovic (1989), for instance, document a positive relationship 
between initial wealth and subsequent entry into self-employment. They use data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men in the United States. Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1998) address concerns that these kinds of estimations may be distorted because wealth may 
be endogenous in the entrepreneurship decision. They exploit information provided by the 
National Child Development Study in Great Britain that indicates whether someone has ever 
received an inheritance or gift. These are regarded as exogenous windfall gains. Consistently 
with the presence of liquidity constraints, the authors find that inheritances or gifts increase 
the probability of self-employment. Similarly Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a, 1994b), using 
individual income tax return data from the United States, report that those who receive an 
inheritance are more likely to enter and to stay in entrepreneurship. 
Subsequent studies question the interpretation of these empirical results as evidence for 
credit constraints. As Cressy (2000) shows, an alternative theoretical explanation for the 
finding that more wealthy agents choose to become entrepreneurs may be that absolute risk 
aversion decreases with wealth. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) reestimate the empirical 
relationship between wealth and the entry probability using the U.S. Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. They report that this relationship is not significant throughout most of the wealth 
distribution, and that a positive correlation exists only for the top 5 percent of the wealthiest 
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households. According to the authors, this nonlinear relationship was overlooked by previous 
literature. Moreover they argue that inheritances are not a valid instrument for wealth, as they 
might be correlated with other, unobserved background factors that might directly influence 
entrepreneurial choice. 
The literature from the United States has triggered similar research in other countries. 
Disney and Gathergood (2009) account for the critique of Hurst and Lusardi (2004) in their 
empirical analysis and conclude that the evidence for financial constraints is weak in the 
United Kingdom as well. Cosh et al. (2009) use survey data on 2,520 entrepreneurial firms in 
the United Kingdom and find that the firms that seriously sought external finance were able 
to obtain, on average, 84.5 percent of the desired capital; the median was even 100 percent. 
However, they also report that the firms could not always obtain the desired type of capital 
and had to resort to less preferred sources in these cases. In contrast, Nykvist (2008) provides 
evidence for the existence of credit constraints in Sweden that is robust to the critique of 
Hurst and Lusardi. She finds a positive but diminishing relationship between wealth and 
transitions into entrepreneurship for the major part of the Swedish wealth distribution. Table 
3 provides a nonexhaustive summary of the empirical literature on the relationship between 
credit constraints and entrepreneurial status and transitions. 
 13 




Data Main method of analysis Identification of credit 
constraints 




National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Men, U.S., 1976, 78 
1) Reduced-form probit 
estimation of probability of 
entering self-employment 
2) Maximum likelihood 
estimation of structural model 
of entrepreneurial selection 
under liquidity constraints 
1) Initial asset holdings (level 
and quadratic terms) as 
explanatory variables in 
reduced-form equation 
2) Estimation of capital 
constraint parameter 
1) Assets have a positive effect on the entry probability, which 
is interpreted as evidence for liquidity constraints 
2) Liquidity constraints are binding for virtually all the 
individuals who are likely to start a business 
Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1994a) 
Matched sample of federal 
individual estate and personal 
income tax returns, U.S., 1981, 85 
Probit estimation of 
probability of entering 
entrepreneurship 
Inheritances as exogenous 
windfall gains 
A $100,000 inheritance increases the probability of entry into 
entrepreneurship by 3.3 % points, which is consistent with 
capital constraints 
Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1994b) 
See above Multinomial logit analysis of 
transition probabilities of 
entrepreneurs 
Inheritances as exogenous 
windfall gains 
A $150,000 inheritance increases the probability of survival as a 





1) National Child Development 
Study, Great Britain, 1981, 91 
2) British Social Attitudes  Survey 
series (1983, 84, 86) and National 
Survey of the Self-Employed, 
U.K., 1987 
1) Probit estimation of self-
employment at age 23 (in 
1981) and 33 (in 1991) 
2) Shares of survey responses 
related to credit constraints 
1) Inheritances and gifts as 
exogenous windfall gains 
2) Direct interview evidence 
1) The receipt of an inheritance or gift increases the probability 
of being self-employed 
2) Survey responses indicate that shortage of capital constrains 
many people from becoming self-employed, and that most 




Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
U.S., 1984-94 
1) Probit estimation of 
business entry 
2) Instrumental variable 
estimation of business entry 
1) Wealth (fifth-order 
polynomial or interval dummies) 
as explanatory variable 
2) Past and future inheritances 
and regional differences in house 
price appreciations as 
instruments for net worth 
1) Flat relationship between wealth and entry; only after the 95
th
 
percentile is a positive relationship found 
2) Both past and future inheritances predict current business 
entry, which shows that inheritances capture more than simply 
liquidity and invalidates them as instruments. Using regional 
house price appreciations, no significant effects of wealth on 
entry are found. Liquidity constraints are not a major deterrent 
to small business creation in the U.S. 
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Data Main method of analysis Identification of credit 
constraints 
Summary of findings 
Nykvist 
(2008) 
Register-based representative data 
set LINDA, 1999-2001, Sweden 
Probit estimates of entry into 
entrepreneurship 
Assets (polynomials of various 
orders or interval dummies) as 
explanatory variables 
Positive but diminishing relationship between wealth and entry. 
The majority of new potential entrepreneurs in Sweden are 
liquidity-constrained. 
Cosh et al. 
(2009) 
Survey of 2,520 entrepreneurial 
firms collected by the Centre for 
Business Research at the 
University of Cambridge, U.K., 
1996-97 
OLS, tobit, probit, and 
Heckman selection models of 
amount of external finance 
sought by firms and 
percentage obtained; 
distinction between specific 
sources of capital 
Direct survey questions on 
finance sought and obtained, 
distinguishing between various 
types of capital 
Firms that had seriously sought external finance were able to 
obtain on average 85% of the desired capital; the median was 
even 100%. However, often firms could not obtain the type of 




British Household Panel Survey, 
U.K., 1995 and 2000 
As in Hurst and Lusardi 
(2004) 
As in Hurst and Lusardi (2004), 
but with a more disaggregated 
measure of unexplained house 
price movements 
Results similar to those of Hurst and Lusardi (2004), only little 
evidence of financial constraints 
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Besides credit constrains, various authors mentioned in this section note that another 
possible explanation for the private equity premium puzzle may be lower risk aversion of 
entrepreneurs in comparison to the remainder of the population (Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002; Polkovnichenko, 2003; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004). If entrepreneurs are 
more risk-tolerant, their wealth portfolios may result from unconstrained individual 
optimization, especially if nonpecuniary returns to entrepreneurship also play a role. In this 
case, the private equity premium puzzle does not necessarily indicate frictions in the capital 
market. The possibility of heterogeneous risk attitudes as an explanation for the puzzle is 
explored in the following sections. 
4 Risk Attitudes and Entrepreneurial Choice 
The results presented so far indicate that the combination of high risk and low returns to 
entrepreneurship can hardly be rationalized at a level of risk aversion deemed plausible for the 
population, at least not as the outcome of free choices in a functioning market. A possible 
explanation may be that risk attitudes are heterogeneous, and that less risk-averse people self-
select into entrepreneurship. 
The roots of such considerations lie in the work of Knight (1921), according to whom the 
central role of entrepreneurs is to bear uncertainty. Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) theoretically 
model entrepreneurial choice as trading off risk and returns. In the equilibrium the less risk-
averse individuals become entrepreneurs. Similarly Rees and Shah (1986) model the choice to 
be self-employed based on the risk-adjusted earnings differential between self-employment 
and dependent employment. They estimate an econometric model using the British General 
Household Survey for 1978, but without an explicit measure of risk attitudes. 
In various studies that use survey data to investigate the relationship between risk 
attitudes and entrepreneurship, the concept of self-employment is used as an indicator for 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship may differ from self-employment. First, in definitions 
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commonly used, entrepreneurship usually implies risk bearing and innovation, sometimes also 
the creation of new jobs, whereas self-employment goes along with income risk but not 
necessarily with innovation and hiring employees. In the context of investment, as discussed 
earlier, an entrepreneur is usually defined as someone with private business equity holdings in 
a firm where she has an active management interest. The different concepts are certainly 
overlapping to a large extent. In the German SOEP waves for 2002 and 2007, about 75 
percent of the entrepreneurs, defined as individuals with a positive amount of private business 
equity, also report self-employment as their primary activity, and about 70 percent of the self-
employed business owners employ at least one worker (Fossen, 2011). 
Figure 1 provides some suggestive evidence that risk attitudes are heterogeneous and that 
the self-employed are more risk-tolerant than the dependently employed. The histograms are 
based on the 2008 SOEP, which included a question about personal willingness to take risks 
(as did the 2004 and 2006 waves). Respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to 
take risks on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (complete unwillingness) to 10 (complete 
willingness). In a field experiment with real money at stake, based on a representative sample 
of 450 persons, Dohmen et al. (2011) find that this survey measure of risk attitudes is a good 
predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. Individuals are classified as self-employed if they 
report self-employment as their primary activity. 
The histograms show that the risk tolerance distribution of the self-employed is shifted to 
the right, in comparison with employees. The mean risk tolerance of the self-employed on the 
11-point scale is 5.50, compared with 4.59 for employees; the difference is statistically 
significant at the 0.1 percent level. Using population weights the difference is even larger 
(5.58 versus 4.56). The sample consists of 1,030 self-employed and 8,570 dependently 
employed persons between eighteen and sixty-five and excludes farmers, family members 
working for a self-employed relative, civil servants, and those currently in vocational training 
or military service. Similar pictures emerge if the waves of 2004 or 2006 are used, or if 
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instead of the self-employed one focuses on entrepreneurs, defined as those reporting positive 
private business equity holdings (see Fossen, 2011). 
Figure 1: Histograms of risk tolerance. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the SOEP (2008). 
 
Table 4 provides additional descriptive statistics of the self-employed in comparison to 
employees in Germany in 2008 (both full time and part time), accounting for population 
weights. Results of adjusted Wald tests of equal means between the two groups are shown in 
the last column; a p-value smaller than 0.01 indicates that a difference is significant at the 1 
percent level. In Germany 39 percent of the self-employed have a university degree, as 
opposed to only 18 percent of the employees. Only 34 percent of the self-employed are 
women. On average, the self-employed are older than employees, and they are more likely to 
have had a self-employed father when they were fifteen years old. A higher share of the self-
employed are involved in service activities for business and in the construction sector, and a 
lower share work in the manufacturing industry. The self-employed receive much higher 
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risk tolerance (0 = risk averse; 10 = ful ly prepared to take risks)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by employment status and tests of equal means 
  
Employees Self-employed Adjusted Wald tests 
of equal means 
(p-values) 
Characteristics (weighted shares in percent)    
Higher secondary school degree 24.73 48.53 0.000 
Apprenticeship 52.01 36.78 0.000 
Higher technical college degree 23.67 27.04 0.124 
University degree 17.67 39.09 0.000 
Female 48.85 33.86 0.000 
Married 53.76 58.49 0.059 
German nationality 90.65 95.15 0.000 
East Germany 16.78 21.21 0.021 
Self-employed father 7.79 14.68 0.000 
Characteristics (weighted means)    
Age (years) 41.85 45.30 0.000 
Work experience (years) 17.36 19.09 0.001 
Unemployment experience (years) 0.74 0.73 0.834 
Income from interests and dividends (euro) 1,039.71 5,535.47 0.000 
Children below 17 in household (number) 0.50 0.59 0.063 
Willingness to take risks (scale 0-10) 4.56 5.58 0.000 
Industries (weighted shares in percent)    
Mining and quarrying 0.15 0.01 0.006 
Manuf. of intermed. / nondurable goods 13.56 3.16 0.000 
Manuf. of investment / durable goods 10.42 3.06 0.000 
Electricity, gas, and water supply 1.12 0.13 0.000 
Construction 4.83 11.19 0.000 
Trade, maintenance, and repair 13.19 11.04 0.139 
Hotels and restaurants 2.81 3.86 0.238 
Transport, storage, and communication 4.88 3.76 0.274 
Financial intermediation, real estate, renting 4.60 5.80 0.286 
Business service activities 7.48 21.86 0.000 
Public and personal service activities 24.33 21.90 0.206 
Not categorized 12.63 14.22 0.415 
Population 30,309,391 3,100,431  
Number of observations 8570 1030  
Note: Weighted by population weights. Source: Author’s calculations based on the SOEP (2008). 
 
Table 5 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients for some of the key variables. All the 
correlations shown are statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. As expected, self-
employment is positively correlated with risk tolerance; capital income, which is an indicator 
of wealth; and age. Risk tolerance is positively correlated with capital income and negatively 
correlated with age, but these correlations are comparably small. 
Are the self-employed more risk-tolerant than employees even when all the other 
characteristics, such as wealth and age, are equal? The answer is yes. This is shown by several 
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econometric studies that control for observed differences when comparing the risk attitudes 
between the self-employed and other groups, based on data sets from various countries. 
Hartog et al. (2002) use three Dutch data sets, while Barsky et al. (1997) employ the Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) in the United States. Both studies find the self-employed to be 
less risk-averse than employees, ceteris paribus, although the difference is not statistically 
significant in the paper by Barsky et al. The psychological literature focuses on differences in 
the risk attitudes between entrepreneurs and hired managers and also confirms higher risk 
tolerance of entrepreneurs. Stewart and Roth (2001) provide a meta-analysis of the empirical 
psychological literature. 
Table 5: Pairwise correlation coefficients 
 Self-employment Risk tolerance Capital income Age 
Self-employment 1    
Risk tolerance 0.1274 1   
Capital income 0.1276 0.0458 1  
Age 0.1087 -0.0746 0.0887 1 
Note: All the correlations are significantly different from zero at the 0.1 percent significance level. 
Self-employment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a person is self-employed, and zero otherwise. 
Risk tolerance is the willingness to take risks on an 11-point scale. Capital income refers to income 
from interests and dividends in euros. Source: Author’s calculations based on the SOEP (2008). 
 
Cramer et al. (2002) use Dutch survey data (which are also used in the study by Hartog et 
al., 2002), where a cohort of schoolchildren were interviewed first in 1952, at the age of 
twelve, and again in 1983 (when forty-three) and 1993 (when fifty-three), as far as they could 
be traced. The 1993 interview included a measure of risk attitudes. By means of a probit 
analysis, the authors find a negative correlation between risk aversion and having been self-
employed at any time in adult life. Van Praag and Cramer (2001) use the same data to 
estimate a structural model of business formation and entrepreneurs’ labor demand. The 
results indicate that risk aversion deters people from entrepreneurship. The shortcoming of 
these studies is that risk aversion is observed many years after the entrepreneurship decision 
in most cases. This is addressed in a study by Caliendo et al. (2009) based on the SOEP. 
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These panel data allow estimating the impact of risk attitudes observed before becoming self-
employed on the subsequent decision to enter self-employment, controlling for wealth, age, 
and other relevant characteristics. The results indicate a positive and significant influence of 
risk tolerance on the probability of entry. This allays possible reverse causality concerns, that 
is, concerns that the higher risk tolerance of existing entrepreneurs may be a result of 
entrepreneurial experience. 
At the equilibrium the self-employment rate is determined both by the entry rate into self-
employment and the exit rate. By estimating discrete time hazard rate models based on the 
SOEP, Caliendo et al. (2010) find an inverse U-shaped relationship between risk tolerance 
and the duration of spells in self-employment, as also suggested by psychological research 
(Chell et al., 1991). A possible explanation is that entrepreneurs who are excessively risk-
tolerant engage in very risky projects with high failure rates, whereas too high risk aversion 
leads to low expected returns from low-risk projects and makes self-employment unattractive 
in comparison to wage work. 
Considering jointly the evidence from the various studies on entry, exit, and the 
probability of being self-employed, one can conclude that the positive effect of risk tolerance 
on entry outweighs the negative effect of excessive risk tolerance on survival, such that on 
balance higher risk tolerance has a consistently positive effect on the probability of being self-
employed. Table 6 summarizes the empirical literature on risk attitudes and entrepreneurship 
using survey measures. 
Entrepreneurs may not only exhibit comparably low risk aversion, but they may also 
have a preference for the skewed distribution of returns that entrepreneurs face: although the 
average returns are low, a small number of entrepreneurial superstars become extremely rich. 
Entrepreneurs may accept a low or even negative expected return if they are offered a small 
probability of a very high return. This skewness affection is suggested by Hartog and 
Vijverberg (2007) and Astebro (2003), for example. 
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The concept of risk aversion refers to rational choices under the assumption that 
individuals know the objective probability distribution of the returns to an entrepreneurial 
venture. However, literature suggests that entrepreneurs tend to be over-optimistic and 
systematically overestimate their likelihood of success (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Forbes, 
2005; Koellinger et al., 2007). The risk-adjusted returns to entrepreneurship may thus be 
lower on average ex post than perceived ex ante, which may add to the explanation of the 
private equity premium puzzle. 
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The finding that risk aversion plays an important role in entrepreneurial choice may have 
implications for tax policy, as taxes influence both the expected level of the after-tax returns 
to entrepreneurship and the risk associated with these returns. The direction of the effect of 
taxes on entrepreneurship is not unambiguous from economic theory. On the one hand, 
Gentry and Hubbard (2000, 2005) argue that a progressive tax schedule reduces the expected 
after-tax return from a risky project and thus discourages entry into entrepreneurship. This 
“success tax” feature of a progressive tax emerges under the assumptions of risk-neutral 
agents and imperfect loss offset. On the other hand, in their classic article Domar and 
Musgrave (1944) demonstrate that governments may encourage entrepreneurship by sharing 
risk through taxation if agents are risk-averse. While the original paper focuses on a 
proportional tax system, a progressive tax exhibits an even stronger “insurance” effect by 
reducing the variance of after-tax income. Cullen and Gordon (2007) present a more 
comprehensive model that integrates the two effects, and a third effect, the “income shifting” 
effect. This effect is implied by the option to incorporate ex post based on realized earnings, 
which is available in the United States. Typically if a business makes a profit, it incorporates 
to benefit from the lower corporate tax rates; if it suffers a loss, it chooses not to incorporate 
in order to deduct the loss from other income under the personal income tax. The higher the 
personal tax rates, the more entrepreneurs benefit from this option. 
Based on a series of cross-sectional tax return data from the United States, Cullen and 
Gordon (2007) estimate that a reduction in personal tax rates would lead to a fall in 
entrepreneurial risk taking, which they attribute to the income shifting and the insurance 
effects. Using the SOEP, Fossen (2009) estimates a structural microeconometric model of 
transition probabilities into and out of self-employment for Germany, which includes a risk-
aversion parameter. In the model individuals make their decisions by trading off risk and 
returns. Simulation results based on the estimated model indicate that a hypothetical revenue-
neutral tax reform in Germany, which would convert Germany’s progressive income tax 
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schedule into a flat-rate tax, would reduce the entry rate into self-employment and not have a 
significant effect on the exit rate. This is consistent with the insurance effect of taxes 
outweighing the success tax feature, as the estimated risk-aversion parameter indicates that the 
individuals in the sample are risk-averse. Other empirical studies (e.g., Parker, 2003; Bruce, 
2000, 2002; Schuetze, 2000; Fossen and Steiner, 2009) find mixed results for the 
responsiveness of entrepreneurial choice to taxation (see Schuetze and Bruce, 2004, for a 
survey). 
5 Risk Attitudes and Portfolios of Entrepreneurs 
The evidence discussed in the previous section indicates that more risk-tolerant people are 
more likely to become and to be entrepreneurs. This section addresses the question of whether 
risk attitudes also influence entrepreneurial behavior beyond the general binary decision. Do 
risk attitudes influence entrepreneurial investment and financing decisions? 
The relationship between risk attitudes and the share of private business equity in 
individual wealth portfolios is analyzed by Fossen (2011). The study relies on the self-
assessed willingness to take risks, which was elicited by the SOEP in its 2004 and 2006 
waves, and on the private wealth balance sheet data from the SOEP 2002 and 2007 waves (see 
earlier discussion). Figure 2 presents descriptive results from the paper. The data clearly 
suggest a positive relationship between risk tolerance and entrepreneurial investment. First, 
with increasing risk tolerance, the share of observations with a positive amount of private 
business equity increases; here ownership of private business equity is used as the definition 
of entrepreneurship. The positive relationship is consistent with the finding that risk-tolerant 
people have a higher probability of being self-employed, as established in the previous 
section. Second, higher risk tolerance also increases both the unconditional share of private 
business equity in the wealth portfolio and the portfolio share of private business equity 
conditional on being an entrepreneur, although the latter relationship is not monotonic in the 
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graph. In Fossen (2011) econometric methods control for observed and unobserved factors 
influencing selection into entrepreneurship and portfolio choice, and deal with potential 
endogeneity of the risk attitude in the portfolio choice equation. The estimation results 
confirm that higher individual risk tolerance significantly increases both the probability of 
holding private business equity and its share in the wealth portfolio conditional on ownership. 
According to these results, the most risk-tolerant individuals have an eight times higher 
probability of owning private business equity than the most risk-averse individuals, and the 
portfolio share of private business equity of the most risk-tolerant entrepreneurs is 
31.5 percent higher than that of the most risk-averse entrepreneurs. 
Figure 2: Risk attitudes and private business equity. 
 
Source: Fossen (2011), based on the SOEP (2002/2007; risk questions from 2004/2006). 
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with her leverage decision, which is also likely to be influenced by individual risk attitudes. 
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who is exposed to firm-specific risk through stock-based compensation.
3
 This is comparable 
to the situation of an entrepreneur who holds private business equity in her firm. Numerical 
simulations of the model reveal that lower assumed risk aversion of the manager leads to 
higher leverage. Risk-averse managers avoid leverage because of the higher volatility of the 
returns. Analogously for risk-averse entrepreneurs this implies that, if possible, they would 
rather sell parts of their business to reduce their risk exposure than take on debt which is risk-
free to the creditor, apart from the default risk. 
The positive relationship between risk attitudes and the portfolio share of private business 
equity found in Fossen (2011) remains unchanged whether or not the debt ratio is included as 
a control variable in the portfolio share equation. The coefficient of the debt ratio is 
statistically insignificant. The debt ratio is calculated as (mortgage + other liabilities)/gross 
wealth. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on these items. 
If an entrepreneur who plans to invest in her firm faces credit constraints, as discussed 
earlier, one possible way to sidestep arranging an explicit credit for her business may be to 
take on mortgage debt on home property or to use consumer credit (e.g., credit card debt) to 
finance the business investment. Thus if entrepreneurs make heavier use of these forms of 
credit than do other people, this may be interpreted as an indication of imperfect business 
credit markets. 
In the SOEP sample mentioned before in this section, two-thirds of the entrepreneurs 
indeed report debt in the form of mortgage or consumer credits, as compared to only half of 
the nonentrepreneurs. The difference is statistically significant. However, the average debt 
ratio is 27.5 percent among entrepreneurs and 32.5 percent among nonentrepreneurs (after 
having removed outliers), and the hypothesis that the average debt ratio is the same for the 
                                                 
3
 In a related paper Ross (2004) analytically derives how compensation contracts affect a risk-averse manager’s 
incentives to take risks. 
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two groups cannot be rejected statistically.
4
 The SOEP data do not allow for observing the 
amount of debt held in the balance sheets of the firms, however. Respondents were asked for 
the net market value of their enterprise, and they were explicitly asked to take into account 
any remaining financial burdens when estimating the value. The debt ratio of entrepreneurs 
would most likely be larger if business liabilities were included. Further research is required 
to analyze the relationship between risk attitudes, portfolio choice, and the leverage decision. 
For a thorough analysis, data on total assets and liabilities within enterprises would be highly 
desirable. A possible step forward could be made if survey data about individual risk attitudes 
could be integrated with enterprise balance sheet data. 
6 Conclusions and Further Research 
This chapter started with the observation reported in the literature that entrepreneurs, on 
average, invest a large share of their wealth portfolio in their own business, despite 
comparably low returns and high risk. This observation may be called a private equity 
premium puzzle (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). 
There is some evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs face credit constraints, although 
this remains controversial. In this case the constraints may force entrepreneurs to invest larger 
shares of their wealth in their own businesses than desired. Capital market frictions may arise 
from agency problems. Outside investors require that entrepreneurs own a substantial share of 
their firms, as they find it hard to monitor an entrepreneur’s effort, and ownership represents 
an entrepreneur’s primary incentive to perform her job. Theoretical work demonstrates that 
models allowing for borrowing constraints are able to fit the empirical outcome when they are 
calibrated, even if the degree of risk aversion in the population is assumed to be 
homogeneous. 
                                                 
4
 These averages are taken after calculating individual debt ratios, which yields different results than calculating 
the ratio of aggregate debt over aggregate gross wealth, using the numbers in Table 1. 
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Another strand of literature shows that lower risk aversion increases the probability of 
becoming and of being an entrepreneur. If entrepreneurs are more risk-tolerant than others, as 
suggested by the evidence, their risky portfolios may result from unconstrained individual 
optimization and do not necessarily indicate frictions in the financial markets. Survey data 
confirm that less risk-averse entrepreneurs devote a larger share of their wealth to their own 
business. Over-optimism of entrepreneurs may contribute to an explanation of their behavior. 
With or without capital constraints, nonpecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship, such as utility 
derived from independence in the workplace, are likely to supplement the low average 
monetary returns and may thus induce the decision to be an entrepreneur. 
The explanations of credit constraints and heterogeneous risk attitudes do not exclude 
each other, but may rather be complementary. In the presence of capital constraints, potential 
entrepreneurs know that if they become entrepreneurs they have to invest a large share of their 
wealth in their own business, since availability of external finance is limited. The high risk 
involved in the resulting undiversified portfolio may explain why only the more risk-tolerant 
individuals enter entrepreneurship in the first place. The self-selected group of existing 
entrepreneurs may voluntarily choose their risky portfolios, so the credit constraints may not 
be binding for them; those constrained by lack of credit may be the would-be entrepreneurs 
who are discouraged from entry. While the joint consideration of the literature reviewed in 
this chapter may suggest these conclusions, they are certainly speculative at this point. More 
theoretical and empirical research is necessary to investigate the relationship between 
imperfect financial markets, heterogeneous risk attitudes, entrepreneurial self-selection, and 
entrepreneurial portfolio investment and financing decisions. Further research along these 
lines may make it possible to better evaluate the effects of government interventions in the 
credit market and of tax policy, which also influences risk, on entrepreneurial choice and 
investment behavior.  
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